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This paper studies the impact of the interactive effect of knowledge characteristics – 
tacitness, specificity and availability— and resource structure —complementarily and 




Preliminary in-depth interviews with three IJV managers were conducted to develop and 
evaluate the tentatively developed questionnaire. The finalized survey questionnaire was 
distributed to middle and top-level managers of IJVs, resulting in a total of 124 usable 
surveys. The psychometric properties of data were evaluated using Cronbach’s alpha and 




The results show that partners in IJV have low tendencies to acquire tacit and specific 
knowledge, but, when the resource is complementary, it stimulates the learning race. 
Also, when resources are asymmetric, IJV partners engage in the learning race more 




The findings provide important insights for both researchers and managers on knowledge 
characteristics and resource structure influencing learning race behavior. This insight 
allows firms to leverage features of knowledge and resource conditions to prevent or 
facilitate the learning race for either common or private interests.  
  









International joint ventures (IJV) are the common vehicle used to enter international 
markets. Through IJV, knowledge and resource are acquired and risks mitigated, as two 
or more businesses with varying sets of know-how partner with a collaborative intent for 
a set period (Dong, Zou, Sun, & Zhang, 2019; Kwon, 2008; Park & Vertinsky, 2016). In 
previous studies, it is highlighted that learning in the IJV relationship is fraught with 
obstacles where a competitive intent dominates the relationship. Firms are eager to learn 
each other’s key competencies, such as superior customer skills and collaborative skills 
(Hamel, 1991; Howard, Steensma, Lyles & Dhanaraj, 2016). Where ‘knowledge is 
power’ tension arises between local partners seeking to learn and foreign partners trying 
to protect valuable knowledge (Jordan & Lowe, 2004; Kale, Singh & Perlmutter, 2000; 
Rechberg, 2018). The opportunistic behavior of partners seeking to outlearn each other, is 
called the ‘learning race’ and will be the focus of this study (Hamel, 1991; Khanna, 
Gulati & Nohria, 1998). 
Inkpen and Beamish, (1997) present that the motivation to outlearn partner at a 
quicker pace arises from a firm’s desire to gain more bargaining power and independence 
from the partner. The principle of learning race is grounded in the resource dependency 
theory (RDT; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) – a firm acquiring valuable resources of another 
firm will shift the balance of power in its favor (McKinley & Mone, 2003). RDT helps to 
explain why learning race (de)escalates when different combinations of knowledge 
characteristics (independent variables) and resource asymmetry (moderating variables) 
are present. Drawing on RDT, we include resource complementarity and resource 
asymmetry as contextual variables, which enables us to not only identify which type of 




knowledge is sought and transferred in IJV, by why competitive learning in IJV occurs. 
For instance, the interaction of tacit and complementary expertise creates a unique 
resource bundle (Yao et al., 2013), escalating learning race even though tacit knowledge 
is difficult to copy.  On the other hand, the interaction between knowledge availability 
and resource complementarity reduces the learning race, although making knowledge 
widely available allows partners to copy such knowledge easily. The understanding of 
such intricate relationships and the underlying reasons are possible only by taking the IJV 
resource structures into account.  
Researchers have examined the mechanism of learning behavior in IJV (Dhanaraj 
et al., 2004), the impact of such learning behavior on IJV performance (Park et al., 2015; 
Sarkar et al., 2001; Dong et al., 2019), and the relationship between knowledge 
characteristics and learning behavior (Yao et al., 2013; Hau & Evangelista, 2007; Kwok 
et al., 2019; Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002). To the best of our knowledge, no studies 
examine the factors that contribute to the learning race in IJV. For this reason, we analyze 
the antecedents that cause learning race behavior of 124 IJVs in China by addressing how 
knowledge characteristics and resource structures can leverage or obstruct learning race 
behavior among partnering firms. We hope that our findings inform practitioners that 
partner in IJV, and scholars about the ease with which knowledge may be copied, and the 
benefits for pursuing to race to learn. 
Theoretical Background 
IJV learning race 
Learning race refers to the intent of an organization in an IJV to outlearn its partner by 
lowering knowledge transparency and acquiring partner’s knowledge at a quicker pace 




(Hamel 1991; Larsson et al., 1998). Even those firms that initially had no intent to gain 
knowledge of a partnering firm may later reassess their strategy (Dong et al., 2019; 
Inkpen, 2000). In pursuit of independence, IJV partners’ desire to learn from each other 
may escalate over time. Inkpen and Beamish (1997, p. 177) termed this phenomenon of 
learning from each other competitively the “race to learn.”  
 In competitive learning, a partner seeks to acquire another’s knowledge rather 
than collaborate for mutual learning. Outlearning the partner enables implementing new 
skills and functions without the support of the partner. As the relationship dependency 
gets reduced, the bargaining power shifts (Hamel 1991; Inkpen & Beamish, 1997).  Since 
each partner is motivated to maximize its relative power by gaining more knowledge than 
it gives, the IJV thrusts into a competitive learning race (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; 
Tsang, 2002). Once a firm in alliance outlearns its counterpart, its dependency on the 
other will diminish. The newly acquired knowledge will allow the organization to 
provide services or create products independently of the other. 
 Here we theorize that knowledge characteristics may significantly impact firms’ 
ability to engage in a learning race (Hau & Evangelista, 2007; Evangelista & Hau, 2009).  
Merely having accessibility to a partner’s specific knowledge does not ensure knowledge 
acquisition. The ability to absorb a partner firm’s knowledge and relationship with the 
partnering firm also determines the effectiveness of knowledge transfer (Inkpen, 2000). 
We examine if interactions between knowledge dimensions and resource structure 
facilitate or hinder learning race in IJV. Specifically, we study three aspects of 
knowledge: 1) tacitness, 2) specificity, and 3) availability. We further explore the 
moderating role of the resource structure, which are resource complementarity and 




resource asymmetry, on the relationship between knowledge characteristics and learning 
race. 
Resource dependence theory (RDT) 
RDT characterizes corporations as open systems facing environmental uncertainties. 
Entering into an alliance helps firms gain access to valuable and complementary 
resources that are difficult to replicate yet critical to address environmental uncertainties 
(Das & Teng, 2000; Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In 
emerging markets, a local firm may provide knowledge about government relations, local 
legislation and consumer behavior, whereas the foreign firm may provide managerial and 
technological expertise (Kim, Chiou, & Calantone, 2018; Piaskowska, Nadolska, & 
Barkema, 2017; Sharp & Barz, 1997). When a foreign firm does not have sufficient 
resources or information to enter into an international market, establishing an IJV can 
help that firm access such necessary resources, reducing uncertainty (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven 1996). 
RDT presents that inter-partner relations enable dependency on other firms’ 
resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In putting forward ‘the matching rule’, RDT 
suggests that partner’s resources need to match the local firm’s specific resource needs 
(Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer, 1972). Some of the specific resources 
partner firms may seek to acquire are regulatory support, market access, legitimacy, 
physical assets information, and human capital (Hillman et al., 2009).  
While RDT in alliance suggests that learning from a partner reduces future 
dependency, such learning, if cooperative, may also develop trust among the partners 
(Inkpen & Currall, 2004). When partners make their knowledge accessible to one 




another, it increases interactions, ensures knowledge sharing, and creates a sense of 
familiarity (Koka & Prescott, 2002). Repeated and successful interactions among partners 
will allow for mutual learning, increasing the trustworthiness in the relationship (Inkpen 
& Currall, 2004). The positive effect of knowledge availability spirals upward to creating 
cooperative learning among alliance partners (Mellat-Parast & Digman, 2008).  
Hypotheses 
Knowledge tacitness and resource asymmetry  
Research on knowledge transfer suggests that explicit knowledge plays a critical role in 
facilitating a learning race (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007). Templates, as well as vision, 
mission, goals, and objectives, if written and codified, are easily acquired (Lyles & Salk, 
2007). In contrast, tacit knowledge, often more valuable, is more challenging to transfer 
among partners (Lyles & Salak, 2007; Rechberg & Syed, 2013). The inherent nature of 
tacit knowledge is that it is embedded in people’s consciousness and difficult to articulate 
(Polanyi, 1962). Organizational tacit knowledge is stored in a team’s norms, values, and 
beliefs that evolve through continuous learning (Chou, 2005; Dong, Bartol, Zhang, & Li, 
2017; Leonard & Sensiper, 1998). As organizational culture continuously evolves, it 
becomes more difficult for firms to retrace all the steps related to the development of 
cultural norms.  
Tacit knowledge is causally ambiguous and challenging to understand and codify 
(Chuang, Jackson & Jiang, 2016; Rechberg & Syed, 2014; Szulanski, 1996). To copy 
tacit knowledge, the rival firm needs to comprehend all underlying cause-effect 
relationships and find ways to apply that knowledge to their setting (Røvik, 2016). The 
presence of cause-effect ambiguity creates a barrier to the imitation of knowledge by a 




partnering firm, thereby depressing the learning race (Barney, 1991; Brookes, 2014; 
Uygur, 2013). For example, during a tour to New United Motor Manufacturing Inc. 
(NUMMI), an alliance between Toyota and General Motors (GM), GM managers were 
amazed to witness only a small number of defects in products. The high-quality 
operational system of the NUMMI was responsible for generating superior products. 
Although such standard of NUMMI was conspicuous, the underlying rationale was 
challenging to communicate, and therefore, difficult for GM to internalize (Inkpen, 
2000).  
Partnering firms may not see immediate value in learning tacit knowledge. 
Explicit and objective knowledge is visible, uncomplicated to acquire, and has immediate 
value (Inkpen & Dinur, 1998). For instance, in American based-joint venture between 
American and Japanese firms, the American firm discounts the importance of product 
quality knowledge of its Japanese counterpart, resisting to acquire such knowledge, 
stating that it would never work in the U.S. (Inkpen & Dinur, 1998). Tacit knowledge 
may, therefore, depress the learning race among IJV partners.  
Additionally, where resource asymmetry is present, the relationship between 
knowledge tacitness and learning race is moderate (Makhija & Ganesh, 1997). Resource 
asymmetry refers to the imbalance and discrepancy of resources shared by partners in IJV 
alliance. When tangible resource contribution in IJV is asymmetric, it will likely yield the 
firm with the majority of equity a bargaining power. Indeed, Makhija and Ganesh (1997) 
argue that the firm with more resources can maintain a dominant position in a joint 
venture by developing control mechanisms such as contracts, rules and regulations, and 
limiting transparency, preventing the effective transfer of knowledge (Hamel, 1991). The 




greater contribution of product and market knowledge in IJV increases the decision-
making power on how to utilize resources. Therefore, a partner may seek to maintain 
resource asymmetry to retain bargaining power (Lee, Chen, & Kao, 2003). 
The willingness to learn and the extent of the knowledge gap between partners 
may matter. Minbaeva et al. (2018) find that the capacity to race to learn depends on the 
attitude of receptivity, and if the knowledge gap is too big, the intent to acquire 
knowledge may not ensure knowledge transfer (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In that 
essence, higher resource asymmetry may depress the learning race. We, therefore, 
hypothesize that:  
H1. When resource asymmetry among partners is high, the local IJV partner commits 
less to the learning race in knowledge acquisition, when knowledge is highly tacit.  
Knowledge tacitness and resource complementarily 
Complementary knowledge refers to the level of resource interdependence in the IJV 
relationship where partners value the contribution of each other experience as necessary 
to accomplish goals and responsibilities. Complementary knowledge may amplify the 
learning race between IJV partners as acquiring it can change the balance of power 
(Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). After receiving sufficient complementary knowledge, the 
faster learning partner’s dependency on the IJV reduces. In contrast to overlapping 
resources, complementary resources may expand the repertoire of a firm’s knowledge 
repository facilitating innovation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Shenkar & Li, 1999).  
Shenkar and Li (1999) found evidence that local IJV partners are likely to seek 
knowledge that complements, rather than overlaps, with their current knowledge base. 




In IJV, tacit knowledge is more valuable to enhancing performance than explicit 
information (Anh et al., 2006). When tacit knowledge is also complementary, the value 
of such knowledge significantly increases because acquiring complementary knowledge 
helps to create a unique resource bundle (Yao et al., 2013) that yields a competitive 
advantage to both the firms in IJV (Anh et al., 2006). Yet, an organization’s ability to 
learn additional tacit knowledge depends on their absorptive capacity (see, e.g., Anh et 
al., 2006; Kostopoulos et al., 2011, Lane, Salk, & Lyles, 2001; Minbaeva et al., 2003). 
Learning intent also determines whether or not a partner in IJV can acquire tacit 
knowledge (Hau & Evangelista, 2007). When partners recognize the value of tacit and 
complementary knowledge, partners will invest in training and development activities 
that foster the acquisition of such knowledge (Anh et al., 2006; Hau & Evangelista, 
2007), for this reason, we hypothesize: 
H2: When resource complementary among partner is high, the local IJV partner commits 
more to the learning race in knowledge acquisition, when knowledge is highly tacit. 
Knowledge specificity and resource asymmetry 
Knowledge specificity refers to the knowledge of IJV partners that is specific to a 
particular functional area, formalized, and separated from other experiences. Knowledge 
specificity could alleviate the causal ambiguity of knowledge and reduce complexity. 
Complex knowledge has a higher degree of interrelated components, making it difficult 
to understand (Winter, 1987). In contrast, specific knowledge may only require an 
understanding of one or a few components (Hansen, 1999). Sequential processes of 
accomplishing a task are often codified in a step-by-step process allowing IJV partners to 
identify what has to be conducted (cause) to achieve a particular result (effect). The 




practice of delineating processes in a step-by-step fashion helps to reduce knowledge 
tacitness, thereby creating a condition that is supportive of knowledge transfer and, 
therefore, the learning race (Balconi, 2002; Cowan & Foray, 1997; Szulanski, 1996).    
One of the primary reasons for firms to enter into an IJV relationship is to acquire 
knowledge of a relational partner (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997), and an alliance is an option 
of gaining access to partners’ expertise and skills (Anh et al., 2006; Hamel, 1991). A high 
degree of asymmetric resource commitment by IJV partners reinforces this concept. By 
contributing the majority of resources to the IJV, a partner will have more bargaining 
power (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Mjoen & Tallman, 1997), maintaining control over the 
alliance activities (Mjoen & Tallman, 1997). To avoid the dominant control of a foreign 
firm over a local firm, a local government may intervene to limit the equity ownership of 
an international firm, as in the case of China before its entering into World Trade 
Organization at the end of 2001 (Lee, Chen & Kao, 2003). But when such government 
regulation is not in place, the local partner may try to shift the bargaining power in its 
favor by involving in a learning race, as more knowledge resources ensure greater control 
over the IJV in future (Fagre & Wells, 1982; Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). 
H3. When resource asymmetry among partners is high, the local IJV partner commits 
more to the learning race in knowledge acquisition, when knowledge is highly specific.  
Knowledge specificity and resource complementarity 
As organizations in IJV identify learning from their partner as a source to reduce resource 
dependency, the learning race may occur only in specific areas that provide IJV partners 
with the strategic control over complementary resources and activities (Mjoen & 
Tallman, 1997). Such resources may be related to technology, marketing and distribution, 




and skills and expertise required to cater to market needs (Yan & Gray, 1994). When the 
complementary knowledge from the partner combines with the expertise of the local 
firm, it will result in the unique resource bundle (Yao et al., 2013). The possession of 
unique resources may not only reduce the local firm’s resource dependency over the 
foreign firm but also be the source of competitive advantage in its domestic market (Anh 
et al., 2006), independent of the partner firm. For this reason, we hypothesize: 
H4. When resource complementarity among partner is high, the local IJV partner 
commits more to the learning race in knowledge acquisition, when the knowledge is 
highly specific. 
Knowledge availability and resource asymmetry 
A high level of knowledge availability means that there is a minimal barrier for firms in 
IJV to learn from each other (Yan & Gray, 1994). Partners are willing to share available 
knowledge (Minbaeva et al., 2018) by encouraging the transfer of personnel between IJV 
organizations (Inkpen, 2000). In an empirical study based on the data obtained from 219 
IJV in Vietnam, Hau and Evangelista (2007) found that the foreign partners aiding local 
partners through training and development enhances the ability to acquire explicit 
knowledge. The accessibility of expertise also helps to foster trust among relational 
partners. Where partners engage in developing relational capital conducive to creating a 
favorable learning environment, employees from one organization have free access to 
another’s knowledge (Park, 2011a). Yet to enable this essential element of knowledge 
exchange, reciprocity in knowledge sharing among partners is necessary (Magnini, 2008; 
Rechberg, 2018).  




The presence of resource asymmetry indicates a discrepancy in IJV partners’ 
resource contribution (Lee et al., 2003). When partners’ resources are complementary, 
and both partners comply with the norms of reciprocity, both partners may contribute 
equally to the IJV (Kwok et al., 2018). Therefore, there may be less motivation from 
either party to hide knowledge or question other’s intent to engage in collaborative 
learning. On the other hand, in the case of resource asymmetry, the continued willingness 
to make knowledge available to partner to maintain symbiotic knowledge exchange could 
be diminished as partners eye on increasing their bargaining power at the expense of the 
other by involving in learning race behavior. We therefore theorize: 
H5. When resource asymmetry among partners is low, the local IJV partner commits 
more to the learning race in knowledge acquisition, when the knowledge is highly 
available. 
Knowledge availability and resource complementarity 
One of the primary motives of the partners in IJV is to reduce the dependency over the 
partnering firm and gain the upper hand in bargaining by learning (Steensma & Lyles, 
2000). To that end, acquiring highly available knowledge plays a critical role. As 
discussed, the complementary expertise of partners combined with the local knowledge 
base yields higher value. Acquiring partners’ knowledge may not only enhance the value 
of one’s experience but may result in an unrivaled resource bundle, which may be a 
source of competitive advantage (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Hamel, 1991).  Since there 
may be the incentive for partners to learn complementary knowledge, and the availability 
of knowledge may facilitate such learning, we hypothesize that: 




H6. When resource complementarity among partner is high, the local IJV partner 
commits more to the learning race in knowledge acquisition, when the knowledge is 
highly available. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
-------------------------- 
Method 
The motivation to research equity-based IJVs in China is that broad diversity of foreign 
investors and a dynamic environment have provided a rich research setting. Both Chinese 
and international partners are highly motivated to learn from and with each other in this 
fast-changing market (Guthrie, 2005). It is widely recognized that most foreign firms and 
local Chinese firms enter into equity joint ventures to gain access to each other’s 
knowledge (Luo, 2000). For example, local Chinese partners seek foreign partners’ 
proprietary technology and management know-how. In contrast, foreign partners are 
interested in local partners’ resources in marketing, distribution channels, and the 
relationships with the local government. Second, the nature of resource endowment in 
equity joint ventures in China provides an excellent context to study IJV learning. Many 
foreign companies entered China in the form of an IJV to reduce risks and uncertainty, 
mostly due to cultural differences, distribution networks, political systems, and market 
dynamism. These companies find it challenging to survive in that environment without 
the help of a local partner. The resource endowment of both domestic and foreign firms 
allows us to scrutinize how the differences in their resources will impact the learning 
mechanism between them. Third, because of the unstable institutional environment and 
high risks associated with international partners, some firms take IJVs as a short-term 
solution to gain market advantage, with makes IJVs more unstable (Luo, 2000) setting 




the base for this study. In general, the setting in China offers all the factors that are 
important to study the learning race, and it has a high generalizable value for 
international management strategy, where cultures, logistics, political systems, and 
market features are different.  
Data collection 
Preliminary in-depth interviews with three IJV managers were conducted to develop and 
evaluate the tentatively developed questionnaire. We asked questions about their learning 
motivation, resource conditions, and knowledge characteristics for competitive learning. 
The interviews helped the researchers to explore the relationships between resource 
condition, knowledge characteristics, and learning race. We also had discussions on the 
measurement scale with professors with expertise in international marketing from the 
local universities that participated in this study. The survey questionnaire was initially 
developed in English, then translated into Chinese for data collection and back into 
English for validity check and data analysis. We discussed the clarity, validity, and 
feasibility of the questionnaire with a total of six bilingual scholars and professionals.  
Three criteria were used to collect the data: 1) the firm had to be in an IJV with at 
least one partner from a foreign country, 2) the IJV had employees from both parent firms 
physically present, and 3) the local firm had more than 30 employees.  
We used convenience sampling and collected data from middle and top-level 
managers of IJVs, who were also part-time MBA students or MBA alumni from three 
Chinese universities. Each university had a contact person who handled the data 
collection process. The contact person handed out the survey at the end of their class and 
collected the surveys at the beginning of class the following week. One school also 




contacted MBA alumni via phone calls, which requested their consent for the survey 
study and emailed the questionnaire. For those who did not send the survey back, a 
second wave of phone calls and emails were made to remind them. The overall response 
rate was 51.3%, and 124 surveys were useable.  
The assessment of potential response bias was done by making the comparison 
between the early response and the late response, current students and alumni, as well as 
comparing responses between the three universities (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). Based 
on the sales revenue, employee size, and IJV longevity, there was no statistically 
significant difference in the mean of measured items between the early response and the 
late response; also, the statistics did not indicate any significant difference among the 
three universities. The sample represents a diverse array of industries, including 
electronics, manufacturing, information technology, medical supplies, services, 
construction, food manufacturing, electricity, and banking. For duplicate data, the lower 
confidence score on the answers was removed as we measured how confident the 
informant was on participants' responses at the end of the survey.  
Measurement 
Knowledge tacitness: This construct was defined as the extent of difficulty to 
articulate and codify a given domain of knowledge. This scale was measured with five 
items using a 7-point Likert scale anchored with Strongly Disagree = 1 and Strongly 
Agree = 7. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.92. 
Knowledge specificity: This construct was defined as specific functional expertise, 
such as product, marketing, and technological know-how. The scale was measured with 




three items using a 7-point Likert scale anchored with Strongly Disagree = 1 and Strongly 
Agree = 7. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.84. 
Knowledge availability: This construct described whether the knowledge is 
available to the other party or not. The scale was measured with five items using a 7-
point Likert scale anchored with Strongly Disagree = 1 and Strongly Agree = 7. 
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.90. 
Resource asymmetry: Resource asymmetry characterized the amount of resource 
invested by individual parties and involved the comparison between the two parties in 
terms of balance/discrepancy. The authors developed the scale based on Gundlach et al.’s 
(1995) work and had participants report their perceptual estimate of the asymmetry of 
resource commitment of the two parties in the IJV. The three items scale used a 7-point 
Likert scale anchored with Strongly Disagree = 1 and Strongly Agree = 7. Cronbach’s 
alpha was 0.86. 
Resource Complementarity: We adapted Sarkar et al.’s (2001) scale and modified 
it for the IJV context. The items characterized the level of resource interdependence in 
the relationship and measured the extent to which both partners perceived the value of 
resources and capabilities that the other brought to the relationship. The scale was 
measured with four items using a 7-point Likert scale anchored with Strongly Disagree = 
1 and Strongly Agree = 7. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.96. 
 
Results 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 




Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to evaluate the measurement model. We 
follow the evaluation procedure of model fitness suggested by Bagozzi and Yi (1988). 
First, we use elliptical reweighted least squares to estimate the model, as the kurtosis 
value is a little bit high. The model converged, and no anomalies appeared in the results, 
such as improper solution or condition codes. The Chi-Square was significant (X2 (215) = 
462.21, p < .01). According to Fornell and Larcker (1981), it can be caused by unknown 
power levels, inadequate goodness-of-fit measure, or sensitivity to the sample size. 
Therefore, we further checked other model fit indices and confirmed that the model fit 
the data well (CFI = .93, IFI = .93, RMR = .08). Second, we examined the convergent 
validity for all the factors. All the items have positive and significant standardized factor 
loadings and variances. Each scale’s AVE is also above .50. Cronbach’s α also showed 
excellent reliability (see Table 1). Third, we used one- and two-factor models to check 
discriminant validity. The results suggest that all the factors are unique and their 
measurements are exclusive to or have no overlap with each other.  
 To address common method variance, we used Harman’s one-factor test. The 
exploratory factor analysis included the items for all six constructs. The unrotated factor 
analysis extracted six principal components. The items did not load on any single, 
common method factor (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). The most prominent factor takes less 
than one-third of the variance. Moreover, a partial correlation test partial out the first 
principal components. The results show that almost all the significant partial correlations 
remained between the factors.   
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 Here 
------------------------------------ 
Econometric model 




Generalized Linear Model (GLM) approach was used to test the model. The following 
equation illustrates our hypotheses.  
LEARNRACE = β0 + β1 TACIT + β2 SPCF + β3 AVAIL  
+ β4 ASMTRY + β5 CMPL + β6 TACIT*ASMTRY  
+ β7 SPCF*ASMTRY + β8 AVAIL*ASMTRY + β9 
TACIT*CMPL + β10 SPCF*CMPL+ β11 AVAIL*CMPL + ε 
Where 
LEARNRACE = learning race between IJV partners 
TACIT = knowledge tacitness 
SPCF = knowledge specificity  
AVAIL = knowledge availability 
ASMTRY = resource asymmetry 
CMPL = resource complementarity 
 Please see table 2 for results, which have strongly supported our hypotheses.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 Here 
------------------------------------ 
 
The rival model 1 with just main effects explained 23% of the variance. Our 
moderation improved the R-square to 37% and further improved to 45% with control 
variables.  
 Tacitness of knowledge suggests a negative main effect on learning race (γ = -
1.36, t = -2.62, p < .05). The moderation of resource asymmetry on the relationship 
between tacitness and learning was not significant, not supporting H1, while resource 
complementarity indicates a significant moderation, neutralizing the negative effect of 




high tacitness (γ = .24, t = 3.15, p < .01), resulting in H2 to be supported. Therefore, 
complementary resources can foster the IJV partners’ motivation to acquire knowledge, 
even if the knowledge tacitness prevents such knowledge transfer (see Figure 1). The 
value of complementary resources might motivate the learning race, regardless of the 
difficulty of acquiring tacit knowledge. 
The main effects model suggests that complex knowledge encourages the learning 
race between IJV partners, while specific knowledge provides fewer incentives on 
competitive learning behavior. Nevertheless, where resource asymmetry is high, specific 
knowledge moderately stimulates to learning race (γ =.12, t = 1.73, p<.10). For this 
reason, highly specific knowledge, which is relatively easier to acquire, induces more 
competitive learning when resource asymmetry is high than when it is low (see Figure 1). 
Due to the power imbalance caused by asymmetric resources, acquiring specific 
knowledge, which is fast and easy to acquire, can be a quick approach to reduce the 
dependency on the other party. At the same time, resource complementarity increases the 
value of specific knowledge, resulting in more learning race, even if the knowledge is 
high specificity (γ =.17, t = 2.29, p < .05). For this reason, H3 and H4 are supported. 
 The main effects model also suggests that inaccessible knowledge is hard to 
acquire, so we observe more learning race behavior when knowledge availability is high. 
However, the effect of availability is depressed by high resource asymmetry (γ = -.21, t = 
-3.44, p < .01). The moderation of resource complementarity shows no impact on 
knowledge availability toward learning race. Thus, H5 was supported, but H6 was 
rejected.  




LEARNRACE = β0 - 0.94 TACIT – 1.20 SPCF + 1.69 AVAIL  
+ 0.29 ASMTRY - 0.42 CMPL – 0.03 TACIT*ASMTRY  
+ 0.15 SPCF*ASMTRY – 0.21 AVAIL*ASMTRY  
+ 0.15 TACIT*CMPL + 0.15 SPCF*CMPL  
- 0.16 VAIL*CMPL + ε 
------------------------------------ 




Our findings support that firms partake in IJV to learn from each other (Inkpen & 
Beamish, 1997). Four out of six hypotheses tested are supported, indicating that the IJVs 
analyzed are committed to the learning race. Partners’ knowledge bases seemingly satisfy 
each other’s strategic learning needs supporting Hillman et al.’s (2000) ‘matching rule’ 
(see also Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). Partners are committed to the learning race 
whether knowledge is specific (H3 and H4) or available (H5). Only when knowledge 
tacitness is high, the learning race behavior is significantly reduced.  
When the knowledge structure is asymmetric, the relationship between knowledge 
tacitness and learning race is statistically insignificant (not yielding support to H1). The 
causal ambiguity of tacit knowledge when resources are asymmetric challenges local 
partners to understand such knowledge (Chuang, Jackson & Jiang, 2016; Rechberg & 
Syed, 2014; Szulanski, 1996). In such a situation, comprehending all underlying cause-
effect relationships and finding ways to apply knowledge to the local setting appears to 
be a real challenge, depressing the learning race. These findings are in line with Barney 
(1991), Brookes (2014), Uygur (2013), and Røvik (2016). Moreover, acquiring tacit 




knowledge is challenging and time-consuming as tacit knowledge is embedded in 
individuals (Polanyi, 1962). For example, Polanyi’s (1962) practical, situational, and 
emotional types of tacit knowledge may be too implicit to shared. The existence of 
valuable tacit knowledge may be beyond its holder awareness (Rechberg & Syed, 2014). 
Tacit knowledge is often embrained, embodied, and embedded in individuals, making it 
difficult to transfer (Collins, 1993). 
To absorb tacit foreign knowledge, a local firm needs preexisting knowledge 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Resource complementarity can foster IJV partners’ drive to 
acquire tacit knowledge. Park (2011b), for example, found that local partner receives 
foreign technical knowledge only if it possesses the necessary skill set to absorb it. Our 
findings confirm that in cases where partner’s resources are complementary, partners 
commit to learning race (H2; see figure 1). Anh et al. (2006) confirm these findings by 
explaining that local partners may be familiar with foreign complementary knowledge, 
motivating the partner to invest in training and development activities to facilitate the 
acquisition of tacit knowledge.   
Successfully racing for tacit knowledge is of significant importance as tacit 
knowledge is the most valuable source of competitiveness and the source of knowledge 
creation (Kaufmann & Runco, 2009; von Krogh et al., 2000). Indeed, RDT suggests that 
IJV can help firms gain access to valuable and complementary resources that are difficult 
to replicate yet critical to address environmental uncertainties (Das & Teng, 2000; 
Hillman et al., 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). However, where knowledge is a source 
of power, partners may deliberately refrain from sharing what they know to protect their 
bargaining power (Rechberg & Syed, 2013; Rechberg, 2018). Inkpen (2000) speaks of 




knowledge protectiveness as one reason for the hindrance of learning race. The prospect 
of a reciprocal joint learning experience that can enable both IJV partners to develop tacit 
knowledge is damaged by opportunism (Cheng, Cai & Jin, 2016; Lumineau & Quélin, 
2012). 
Where knowledge is specific and available, partners partake in the learning race, 
whether resources are complementary (H4) or asymmetric (H3 and H5) in nature. 
Specific knowledge may be copied without extensive effort as such knowledge may be 
explicit, codified, and sequential. Complementary resources combined with specific 
knowledge ease knowledge acquisition because it only requires some previous 
understanding (Hansen, 1999), facilitating the race to learn (Barney, 1991; Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Shenkar & Li, 1999). When knowledge is specific (H3 and H4), local 
IJV partners commit to the learning race, more so when IJV partner’s resources 
complementary is high (H4), and less so when resources asymmetry is high (H3). 
Specific knowledge such as functional expertise, production, marketing, and 
technological know-how, combined with the existing knowledge pool, can reduce 
resource dependency. Where resource asymmetry exists, the race for specific knowledge 
may enhance bargaining power (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Hamel, 1991). For example, 
Danis and Parkhe (2002), found that in a Hungarian–Western alliance, the Hungarian 
partners learned specific methods of management from their partner, allowing them to 
gain independence and competitiveness in the local market. 
When the resources contributions are balanced, IJV partners become less 
aggressive on learning race, particularly for highly available knowledge. Partners can 
acquire available knowledge such as templets, written vision, mission, goals, and 




objectives without much effort (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007).  Even though available 
knowledge may exist beyond the IJV, limiting its sources for competitiveness, available 
knowledge can be a valuable source of independence (Steensma & Lyles, 2000) and thus 
worth racing for learning.  
We did not find support for Hypothesis 6, which states that in the presence of high 
knowledge availability and high resource complementarity, the local IJV partners commit 
more to the learning race. On the contrary, in such a situation, the learning race declined. 
By making knowledge available, partners had an easy access to each other’s knowledge, 
assisting collaborative learning. When knowledge is widely accessible, maybe 
collaborative -, rather than competitive - learning dominates the relationship. 
Complementarity resources in IJV provide benefit to both the parties. In this situation, 
each partner will have a vested interest in sustaining the ongoing relationship through 
collaboration so that each can continue benefiting from the other's complementary 
resources. As a result, the learning race, which may be viewed as a hindrance to 
collaboration lessens (Larsson et al., 1998).  
Implications for research 
The findings of this study have implications for both theory and practice. First, RDT 
presents that inter-partner relations result in dependency on other firms’ resources 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). When the resources of partners match the local firm’s 
specific resource needs, the dependence solidifies (Hillman et al., 2000; Pfeffer, 1972). In 
IJV, alliance partners depend on each other for resources and expertise. They seek 
regulatory support, market access, legitimacy, physical assets information, and human 
capital (Hillman et al., 2009). The dependency will also result in bargaining power for the 




partner with more resources (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Lecraw, 1984; Yan & Gray, 
1994). Resources in our study is knowledge, and the bargaining power could be increased 
by increasing the knowledge gap and resource asymmetry. Bargaining power literature 
presents that the more powerful firm in IJV enjoys management control (Lecraw, 1984; 
Yan & Gray, 1994). It is reasonable to argue that a lesser powerful firm tries to reduce 
the knowledge gap, and thus, dependency, as much as possible (Hamel 1991; Inkpen & 
Beamish, 1997). We empirically identify ex-ante conditions – that is, some combinations 
of knowledge characteristics and resources structure - under which the bargaining power 
could shift. Our primary contribution to the bargaining power literature is that the shift in 
bargaining power is difficult, especially when the knowledge is tacit in nature. Tacit 
knowledge is causally ambiguous, embodied and encultured (Blackler, 1995).  When 
collaboration, rather than competitive learning, dominates the relationship, the shifting of 
the bargaining power is of less relevance because partners are making their knowledge 
widely available to one another at the outset. 
Implication for practice 
 
There is growing evidence from our research and others that the partners in IJV involve 
in competitive learning for independence. The short-term benefit of competitive learning 
comes at the expense of long-term benefits of collaboration. Competitive learning is a 
threat to IJV survival. IJV longevity and durability allows partners to accumulate 
knowledge and capabilities from each other, overcoming possible competitive 
disadvantage and achieving global competitiveness (Delios & Beamish, 2001; Steensma 
& Lyles, 2000). For emerging economies such as China, IJV survival ensures the 
development of the private sector and establishes a strong presence in the region 
(Steensma & Lyles, 2000). Our study indicated that the condition that could deter 




competitive learning in IJV is for both partners to make their knowledge widely available 
to one another and decrease the inequality in IJV equity as much as possible. 
Knowledge availability in the IJV relationship could also help develop trust 
among IJV partners (Ke & Wei, 2007). Trust reflects good intent, reliability, and 
competence of partners’ sharing their knowledge.  When inter-organizational trust is 
present, the partners do not foresee each other as competing for learning and taking 
advantage of others to gain a bargaining power (Ke & Wei, 2007).  
On a positive note, our study indicated that the presence of tacit knowledge, 
which is the most valuables source of competitiveness, reduces learning race. Partners 
could acquire tacit knowledge, which is embodied (know-how), encultured (shared 
understanding), and embedded (organizational routine; Blackler, 1995), through long-
term collaboration and not through competitive learning. Therefore, we recommend that 
partners use caution when learning know-how. Moreover, we recommend IJV partners to 
understand that tacit knowledge is not something that could be achieved hastily through 
learning race, as doing so could only jeopardize IJV survival.  
We also advise partners in IJV to take stock of their prerequisite knowledge or 
absorptive capability, which is required to learn advance skills (Fang & Zou, 2010). To 
that end, understanding differences in partner’s culture could be a good starting point. 
Chinese managers stress on a long-term human resource management (HRM) such as 
long term contract strategy whereas Western managers stress on a short term HRM 
strategies such as hire-and-fire (Buck, Liu, & Ott, 2010). Differing national and 
organizational culture leads to misunderstanding and friction between partners (Hau & 
Evangelista, 2007), hampering the ability to absorb knowledge (Simonin, 1999) 




successfully. Culture-based factors that can restrain knowledge sharing include values, 
norms, and individuals’ fairness perception (Kohlberg, 1981; Rechberg, 2018). 
And lastly, to establish essential element of knowledge exchange, reciprocity in 
knowledge sharing among partners is necessary (Rechberg, 2018). Learning from each 
other results in reduced dependency, yet successful sharing knowledge among partners 
may create a climate of trust in an alliance (Magnini, 2008).  
Limitations and future studies 
There are several limitations to this study. First, we rely on a single source data to 
examine the learning race behavior in IJV. Both foreign and local firms could undertake 
the learning race, solely relying on one respondent may therefore not provide a complete 
picture of learning race behavior in IJV. Future research may collect data from both the 
local and foreign firms to measure the learning race in IJV. Second, we use resource 
structure as the environmental condition for the investigation of knowledge 
characteristics and learning race. Other conditions could either deter or facilitate learning 
race. We suggest for more research on the impact of absorptive capacity of firms, fairness 
perception, the longevity of IJV, and organizational or national cultural differences to 
investigate the intensity of learning race in IJV. Moreover, what effect does reciprocity 
and trust have on learning race behavior in IJV? Third, we did not empirically address the 
consequences of learning race behavior. Inkpen and Beamish (1997) present that the shift 
in the bargaining power as a result of the learning race could lead to instability in IJV and 
early termination of the alliance. In the future, researchers could examine the 
consequences of learning race on IJV survival and longevity. In the hypotheses 
development section, we briefly mentioned the importance of control mechanisms such 




as contracts, rules, and regulations that enable firms to protect their knowledge from 
imitation by partner, however, we do not test the impact of control mechanisms on 
learning race. It will be an exciting pursuit for future research to examine the extent of 
the effect that control mechanisms have on preventing learning race. It is also essential to 
understand how partners in IJV develop mechanisms to protect their tacit knowledge, 
something that is difficult to bring under the purview of control mechanisms, such as 
contractual agreement. 
Conclusions   
This study informs IJV theory and practice that knowledge characteristics and resource 
structures impact IJVs’ learning race behavior. We use RDT to develop arguments for 
our hypotheses. Our analysis of 124 IJVs shows that some interactions between 
knowledge characteristics and resource structure are either more valuable or easier to 
acquire than others. Namely, partners in IJV tend to commit more to learning race for 
tacit and highly specific knowledge when organizations in IJV share complementary 
resources. Moreover, partners commit more to learning race for highly specific 
knowledge when resource asymmetry is high, and highly available knowledge when 
resource asymmetry is low. In the discussion section, we provide the theoretical and 
practical implications of our study. By conducting this study, we have identified 
conditions that could lead to learning race in IJV.  We recommend that partners in IJV 
involve in long-term collaborative learning and avoid learning race, which may threaten 
the survival of IJV.  We also presented four limitations of this study and simultaneously 
suggest research the future course of actions to address learning race behavior in IJVs. 
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Learning Race (AVE = .73, Cronbach’s α = .88)    
We have tried to learn the knowledge/skills from our 
partner as fast as we can. 
.83 .69  
Wherever possible, we have tried to be faster than our 
partner in acquiring knowledge/skills. 
.95 .90 10.94 
We have been racing with our partner in learning from 
each other. 
.77 .59 8.79 
Resource asymmetry (AVE = .72, Cronbach’s α = .86)    
There has been an imbalance in the resource commitments 
between our partner and us. 
.78 .61  
The discrepancy of the amount of resources committed by 
our partner and us to the JV has been large. 
.96 .92 9.25 
Our partner and we have contributed approximately the 
same amount of resources to the JV. 
.79 .62 8.43 
Resource complementarity (AVE = .87, Cronbach’s α = 
.96) 
   
Both partner firms have needed each other’s resources to 
supplement their own resources. 
.94 .88  
Both partner firms have needed each other’s resources to 
accomplish their goals and responsibilities. 
.93 .86 18.30 
Resources brought into the venture by each partner firms 
have been valuable for each other. 
.95 .90 19.25 
Resources brought into the venture by each partner firms 
have played an important role in the JV. 
.91 .82 16.88 
Knowledge Characteristics:    
Tacitness (AVE = .68, Cronbach’s α = .92)    
The knowledge/skills that we have tried to learn from our 
partner-> 
   
are provided in specific manuals. .84 .71  
are clearly described with operating procedures. .86 .74 10.82 
are embodied in software or documentation.  .88 .77 11.07 
are easily codifiable (in instructions, formulas, etc.) .83 .69 10.14 
are more explicit than implicit.  .70 .49 7.95 
Specificity (AVE = .65, Cronbach’s α = .84)    
are about specific functional areas. .81 .65  
can be specified by step-by-step. .88 .77 9.44 
can be separated from other things. .72 .52 7.58 
Availability (AVE = .60, Cronbach’s α = .89)    
The knowledge/skills that we tried to learn from our 
partner are accessible to our personnel. 
.66 .44  




Employees from our firm had free access to our partner’s 
knowledge/skills. 
.72 .52 6.33 
We could get hold of our partner’s knowledge/skills 
whenever we want to. 
.91 .82 7.52 
Our partner was willing to share with us the 
knowledge/skills. 
.77 .59 6.72 
There were no barriers for us to learn about the 
knowledge/skills from our partner. 
.80 .64 6.92 





















Table 2. Regression model for learning race 
Variables 
Model 1  









Intercept 2.92*** (.83) 5.93 (4.51) 7.47* (4.35) 
Knowledge tacitness -.11 (.08) -.94* (.53) -1.36** (.52) 
Knowledge specificity .17* (.09) -1.21** (.59) -1.23** (.56) 
Knowledge availability .06 (.08) 1.69*** (.54) 1.56 (.51) 
Resource asymmetry  -.02 (.07) .29 (.55) 0.34 (.52) 
Resource complementarity .19** (.09) -.42 (.64) -1.03 (.63) 
Moderations       
Knowledge tacitness  
× 
Resource asymmetry 












  -.21*** (.06) -.21*** 
 
(.06) 
Knowledge tacitness  
× 
Resource complementarity 












  .16** (.07) -.13* 
 
(.07) 
Control variables       
Cultural compatibility     -.04 (.09) 
Interfirm rivalry     .26*** (.07) 
Trust      .02 (.11) 
R-Square .23 0.37 .45 
F Value  7.04 (5, 118) 5.98 (11, 112) 6.28 (14, 109) 
Root MSE .99 .92 .88 
*p<.10. ; **p < .05. ; ***p < .01. 




Figure 2. Moderating effects of resource complementarity and asymmetry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
